

ORIGIN ISN-00

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	DODE-00	DOTE-00	DS-00	EAP-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VCJ-00
	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00	CAC-00	MOFM-00
	MOF-00	M-00	VCIE-00	NEA-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NIMA-00
	CAEX-00	PM-00	GIWI-00	P-00	ISNE-00	FMPC-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	T-00	NCTC-00	CBP-00	SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2034
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [MASS](#) [AE](#) [MU](#) [SA](#) [YM](#) [IR](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP TO IRANIAN FLIGHTS
INFORMATION

REF: A. STATE 5567
[1](#)B. STATE 4162
[1](#)C. STATE 3948
[1](#)D. STATE 3521
[1](#)E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL)
[1](#)F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)

Classified By: William Malzahn, Acting Director ISN/CATR,
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an urgent action request to Embassies Abu Dhabi, Khartoum, Muscat, Riyadh, and Sanaa. Please deliver as soon as feasible. Please see paragraphs 4 and 5.

Background

[1](#)2. (S/NF) Ref A expanded the action in Ref B to include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Yemen, Chad, and Sudan. Ref B asked Sudan to stop Badr Airlines flights from Tehran, Iran to Khartoum, Sudan which we believed are carrying lethal military equipment. Earlier Washington advised Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen in Ref C with updated information that additional flights may be planned for 23 and 24 January, which we are concerned could also be used to transfer arms from Iran to Sudan. Ref D advised that Washington had received information that the UAE firm Ramjet Aviation Support requested overflight permission from the Civil Aviation Authority in Yemen for Sudan's Badr Airlines to conduct chartered flights on 16 and 17 January 2009 between Iran and Sudan. Ref E advised Egyptian authorities that Sudanese airlines may be involved in the transfer of arms to Hamas. Ref F informed that Iran intended to conduct arms shipments to Hamas via Sudan and that the arms were expected to be transferred via aerial routes using cargo planes.

Objectives

[1](#)3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:

-- Inform host governments that Iran intends to continue delivering lethal military equipment to Sudan in the near

future using airlines not necessarily of Iranian origin.

-- Inform the host government that additional flights are expected to depart this weekend or early next week.

-- Ask host nation to stop the flights.

-- Ask to be provided information that is regularly required for overflight requests.

-- Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

-- Continue to stress to Sudan the United States considers this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our two countries are working together towards critical issues of UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Action Request

14. (S) Posts are requested as soon as feasible, bearing in mind the timeframe of the information, to use the points in para 5 to approach host governments to inform them of the flights and request their assistance to stop the flights, in Sudan's case, or to deny overflight or require the planes to land for inspection.

15. (SECRET/REL UAE, YEMEN, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SUDAN)
Begin Talking Points:

-- Iran intends to continue delivering arms to Sudan in the near future using cargo flights of various airlines (not necessarily of Iranian companies), most likely in order to transfer them to Hamas.

-- These flights are expected to depart from Iran to Sudan this weekend or in the beginning of next week.

-- The Iranians may attempt to dissimulate the type of cargo loaded on the flights, their destination, and route.

-- As we noted in our previous demarche on these flights, we appreciate any assistance you can provide regarding the military-related flights between Iran and Sudan and request that you remain vigilant on denying additional flights.

-- As you are aware, there is information that is regularly required for overflight requests. We would like to know what information was provided to you. The regularly required info is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration, nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination, date/time, entry/departure points.

-- Additionally, all overflights require fees to be paid. Countries can deny overflight permissions because overflight- or other flight-related fees by the parties involved with operating the flights are in arrears. We request that you look into this avenue as an additional means to refuse future overflights.

-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.

-- In view of the above, we request that planes flying from Iran to Sudan be denied overflight or be inspected and any arms found on the planes be confiscated.

End Talking Points

¶6. (U) Department appreciates Posts' assistance in this matter. ISN/CATR POCs are Ann Ganzer (ganzerak@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2718) , Margaret T. Mitchell (mitchellmt2@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2433; and Mike Roller (rollerimj@state.gov.gov); 202-647-0255.
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